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关于check http://www.gter.net 2002-9-22 22:38:30 水木清华 |
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1. Check if you submit real documents. 2. Check you school. The consul may send fax to your school interantional of fice. 3. Check your spouse.(F2, H4) 4. Your major or job involves sensitive technology. I will post link and an article about the forth category below. There is one thing I need to remind you: The forth category check is sent to Visa Office, Bureau of Consular Affair, the Department of State. Not INS. Before you enter the US, you never deal wi th INS. If you want help from US senator, you must have a friend in the US. Anyone is OK. No matter he is citizen or not. The website or email are easy to find online. Just search in Yahoo or google or altavista. Write to the senator. Email may do. If you can persude your boss or school officer to contact loca l senator, that is better. Remember give enough information about you when senator is contacted. Like, what you will do in your job, how it is not sensitive. Better send support l etters from your boss, department and international office. Don't complain. Don't be emotional. It can't help. It may worsen the situati on. Remember be cautious when you try to contact congressman. Don't give fal se information.( one of my friends is on the warning list. Can't enter US an ymore. Please see the link: travel.state.gov/reciprocity/Mantis_TAL.htm Please read this article: *************************************************************** DEPARTMENT OF STATE TECHNOLOGY ALERT LIST (TAL)- April 2001 (For Use in Issuing Visas for Scientific Study or Research in the US) Please Note: The following instruction sheet is a copy of a cable sent by the US Department of State to US Embassies and Consulates abroad. It is pro vided to assist international students and scholars in understanding US secu rity concerns. Both international students and J-1 and H-1B scholars may no w be subject to a security check when applying for a visa stamp at a US emba ssy or consulate abroad. Security checks may take 20 work days or more. It is important for international students and scholars in scientific fields t o carefully review the following list. If your discipline is on the list, i t is important for your academic advisor and/or supervisor to write a detail ed letter about your studies or research and how it does or does not apply t o this list. If your research or studies DO apply to this list, travel shou ld be scheduled to include a potential one month security check. A letter fr om your department, explaining what you do, can be presented when applying f or a visa and may facilitate the speed at which a visa stamp in the passport can be granted at an American Embassy or Consulate Abroad. Please call 784 -6874 for an appointment at the OISS with a scholar advisor if you have any questions or concerns about travel and application for a visa for internatio nal students and scholars whose discipline is on this list. SUMMARY FOR CONSULAR OFFICERS: This cable transmits the technology alert list (TAL) and provides guidance f or its use in cases that may fall under the purview of in a section 212 (sma ll a) (3) (A), which renders inadmissible aliens who there is reason to beli eve are seeking to enter the U.S. to violate U.S. laws prohibiting the expor t of goods, technology or sensitive information from the U.S. While applica nts from any country (including our traditional allies and trading partners) , coming to engage in an activity related to one of the "critical fields" on the list may be ineligible under this section, consular officers should pay particular attention to cases involving nationals of countries on the depar tment's list of state sponsors of terrorism or a region subject to non-proli feration controls identified in the published non-proliferation export contr ol regulations. U.S. laws and regulations prohibit the export of certain technologies from t he in a. section 212 (small a) (3) (A) of the INA renders inadmissible alien s who there is reason to believe seek, to enter the U.S. to violate or evade these laws. That means that with sufficient information. The consular offic er has the power to prevent sensitive technology or material which might inc lude nuclear or biotechnical information from falling into the wrong hands. The technology alert list (TAL) was designed to assist you in this effort. STATE DEPARTMENT RATIONALE: Not since the cold war has the transfer of sensitive technology to hostile i ndividuals or regimes been more in the news. The increasing sophistication o f off-the-shelf technology, dual-use technologies (technologies which have b oth civilian and military applications), lack of sufficient information abou t and controls on foreign students here in the U.S. and recent tensions in t he middle east have combined to renew concern among the law enforcement and intelligence communities that U.S. produced goods and information are vulner able to theft. The TAL was originally designed to help maintain technological superiority o ver the Warsaw pact and was targeted at individuals from the Soviet Union an d other communist countries. In 1966, the TAL was revised to broaden its foc us and reflect more accurately current laws restricting or prohibiting the e xport of goods, technologies, technical data and intangible know-how. These laws are designed to further four important security objectives. --stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile deli very systems; --restraining the development of destabilizing conventional military capabil ities in certain regions of the world; --preventing the transfer of arms and sensitive dual use items to terrorist states; and --maintaining U.S. advantages in certain militarily critical technologies HOW TO USE THE ALERT LIST: The revised TAL consists of two parts: a "critical fields list" (CFL) of maj or fields of controlled goods and technologies of tech transfer concern, inc luding those subject to export controls for non-proliferation reasons, and t he department's list of designated state sponsors of terrorism. While restri ctions on the export of controlled goods and technologies apply to nationals of all countries, applicants from countries on the list of state sponsors o f terrorism seeking to engage in a commercial exchange or academic pursuit i nvolving one of the critical fields warrant special scrutiny. At first glanc e, the language in the CFL will seem like gibberish. Officers are not expec ted to be versed in all the fields on the list. You should shoot for familia rization and listen for key words or phrases from the list in applicants' an swers to your interview questions. When applying the TAL consular officers should first: --try and determine whether the applicant proposes to engage in one of the s cientific, technical fields listed in tab A. --if the applicant's planned activities raise questions of possible ineligib ility under INA 212 (small a) (3) (A), submit an SAO in the form of visas do nkey. A designator, like the now defunct "comex", is being developed for tec h transfer cases. Until guidance is forwarded to the field, posts should con tinue to use visas donkey.) Please note: an SAO is mandatory in all cases of applicants bearing passports of or employed by states designated as state s ponsors of terrorism (see tab b for list) who seek to engage in a commercial exchange or academic pursuit involving one of the critical fields. --when an SAO is submitted in a 'TAL" case, conoffs [consular officials] sho uld gather and report as much information as possible about the applicant's background, proposed activities, and travel plans. The effectiveness of the name check (and the turnaround time) are directly affected by the completene ss of the information in the SAO. For example: what branch of physics does t he applicant study? Quantum? Nuclear? what is his current position and where does he work? What is the address and phone number of the company (IES) he intends to visit? Who is his point of contact? Who is funding the travel or education? Will he be returning to work in a country which sponsors terroris m or is under sanctions? How does the applicant plan to use the goods or kno wledge acquired? Will he be "exporting" this new knowledge to a hostile nati on? NOTE TO CONSULAR OFFICERS ON "SPLEX", "CHINEX" AND "VIETEX" CASES If an applicant from Russia or China proposes to engage in study or commerce in a field on the tech alert list, conoffs should continue to process them in accordance with existing guidelines, i.e. post-issuance name check cables for Russians (EAGLE SPLEX) and Chinese (EAGLE CHINEX). If, however, you be lieve there is a possibility that an applicant from Russia or China plans to engage in an illegal transfer of technology and may be excludable under (3) (a), submit an SAO, using the donkey designator and include the SPLEX and C HINEX designations in the subject line for these cases. Should a Vietnamese applicant subject to VIETEX name check requirements also give rise to tech t ransfer concerns, officers should submit an SAO and include VIETEX in the su bject line. TAB A: CRITICAL FIELDS LIST A. CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS: technologies associated with warhead and other l arge caliber projectiles, reactive armor and warhead defeat systems, fusing and arming systems. B. NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY. BACKGROUND: This section covers technologies associ ated with the production and use of nuclear material for both peaceful and m ilitary applications.) included are technologies for enrichment of fissile m aterial, for reprocessing irradiated nuclear fuel to recover produced pluton ium. production of heavy water for moderator material, plutonium and tritium handling, as well as certain associated technologies related to high-energy physics.) includes research and power reactors, breeder and production reac tors, fissile or special nuclear materials, uranium enrichment including gas eous diffusion, centrifuge, aerodynamic, chemical, electromagnetic isotopic fuel reprocessing, plutonium, mixed oxide nuclear research, inertial confine ment fusion (ICF), magnetic confinement fusion, plasma, nuclear fuel fabric ation including mixed oxide (uranium-plutonium) fuels (MOX), heavy water pro duction, tritium production and use, electromagnetic pulse (EMP); hardening technology. C. MISSILE/MISSILE TECHNOLOGY. BACKGROUND: technologies associated with a ir vehicles and unmanned missile systems. the technology needed to develop a satellite launch vehicle is virtually identical to that needed to build a b allistic missile.) technologies include rocket systems, ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles and sounding rockets and unmanned air vehicle systems, missile launchers, launch support equipment and reentry vehicles. D. AIRCRAFT AND MISSILE PROPULSION AND VEHICULAR SYSTEMS: BACKGROUND: the propulsion technologies included are associated with near-earth super and hy personic flight propulsion systems for aircraft and missiles. many of these technologies are dual use.) technologies include liquid and solid rocket pro pulsion systems; missile propulsion and systems integration; individual rock et stages or staging/separation mechanism aerospace thermal and high-perform ance structures, propulsion systems test facilities. E. NAVIGATION AND GUIDANCE CONTROL. BACKGROUND: these capabilities direct ly determine the delivery accuracy and lethality of both unguided and guided weapons. the long-term costs to design, build and apply these technologies have been a limiting proliferation factor.) technologies include those assoc iated with internal navigation systems, tracking and terminal homing devices ; accelerometers, vehicle and flight control systems. F. CHEMICAL AND BIOTECHNOLOGY ENGINEERING. BACKGROUND: of specific concer n is the ability to develop, produce, and disseminate toxic chemicals, biolo gical and toxin agents. the technologies that could be applied to produce ch emical and biological agents are used widely by civilian research laboratori es and industry; these technologies are relatively common in many countries. advanced biotechnology has the potential to support biological weapons rese arch.) look for technologies associated with bacteriology (especially pathog enic) mutagens, mycology, neurotoxins, recombinant technology. G. REMOTE IMAGING AND RECONNAISSANCE. BACKGROUND: remote sensing technol ogies are inherently dual-use: technologies can be used for civilian imagery projects or for military reconnaissance efforts. drones and remotely pilote d vehicles enhance reconnaissance abilities.) these are technologies associa ted with remote sensing satellites: imagery systems; high resolution cameras and optics; unmanned air vehicles; remotely-piloted vehicles, drones. H. ADVANCED COMPUTER/MICROELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY. BACKGROUND: advance comp uters and software play a useful (but not necessarily critical) role in the development and deployment of missiles and missile systems, and in the devel opment and production of nuclear weapons. advance computer capabilities are also used in over-the-horizon targeting, airborne early warning targeting, e lectronic countermeasures (ECM) processors.) These technologies are associat ed with supercomputing, hybrid computing, speech processing, recognition sys tems; neural networks, data fusion, quantum wells, resonant tunneling; super conductivity; advance optoelectronics, acoustic wave devices, superconductin g electron devices flash discharge type x-ray systems; frequency synthesizer s, microcomputer compensated crystal oscillators. I. MATERIALS TECHNOLOGY. BACKGROUND: The metallic, ceramic and composite materials are primarily related to structural functions in aircraft, spacec MicroEdu.com 微迪留学 版权所有 © 1999-2003 webmaster@microedu.com |