The success of these parties found full correspondence in the results of the provincial and municipal ones. In the total of 86 provinces, in percentage and in seats there were these variations from 1970 to 1975: PCI from 26.7 to 32.7%, and from 701 seats to 860 (the PDUP went from 0.5% and 4 seats) ; PSI from 11.1% to 12.7%, and from 247 to 330 seats; PRI from 3 to 3.4%, and from 60 to 73 seats; PSDI from 7.3 to 5.8%, and from 177 to 142 seats; DC from 37.3 to 34.8% and from 1023 to 946 seats; PLI from 4.9 to 2.7%, and from 101 to 43 seats; MSI from 6 to 6.8% and from 139 to 161 seats. Limiting ourselves to the provincial capitals, the seats were assigned as follows: PCI from 839 to 1139 (and 15 went to the PDUP); PSI from 382 to 498; PRI 129 to 145; PSDI from 283 to 220; AD from 1400 to 1394; PLI from 179 to 84; MSI from 224 to 265. The PCI thus won 300 more seats than in 1970, the PSI 116, the PRI 16, the DC lost 6,
According to Transporthint, the election results required careful scrutiny within all parties. The Moro government continued to remain in office supported by the quadripartite, while on the level of local administrations the center-left formula was replaced, by often chaotic or improvised forces, with a whole series of new majorities. Meanwhile the government continued its action. In August, at a meeting of the Council of Ministers, the anticonjunctural plan was launched, a vast regulatory complex that affected some of the major sectors of the country’s economic life: with six hundred billion the law for construction was refinanced, 650 billion were allocated for interventions in agriculture; financing for exports and the ceiling have also increased insurance while other interventions concerned transport, hospitals and ports. Finally, concessions were granted to small industry. In foreign policy, the Moro government opened the way to the definitive solution of the Trieste question, after bilateral agreement with Yugoslavia. The basis of the negotiation, authorized by the Parliament of the two countries, provided for the definitive recognition of Italian sovereignty over zone A and Yugoslav sovereignty over zone B; border adjustments around Gorizia in favor of Italy; right of option for Italian and Yugoslav citizens in the two areas. The creation of a passage channel was also planned, in deep waters, to allow the access of large tonnage ships to the port of Trieste without passing through Yugoslav waters and
In terms of alignments and political forces, while the PSI proclaimed a line of autonomy and equidistance from both the PCI and the DC, the most immediate reaction to the vote of June 15 took place in the Christian Democrats: in the month of July the council met national party, in a tense climate of distrust for the secretariat: the dorotei and the groups of Andreotti and Colombo left the management and on 22 July Fanfani’s report was rejected with 103 votes against and 69 in favor. When the candidacy failed Piccoli, supported by the Dorotei, was called to lead the party, to try to revive it, B. Zaccagnini. As for the liberal party, the secretary Bignardi and the president of the Malagodi party presented their resignations to the national council meeting in October, already set for that of July, who had noted the split in the party. The lack of an agreement with the opposition led to a direct confrontation between the majority and the minority in the autumn council: in the vote of 12 October Malagodi and Bignardi were confirmed in their respective offices, with a small margin of majority, confirming the serious split existing in the internal party and the impossibility of reaching an understanding between the currents.
Throughout the last months of 1975, the Moro government was engaged in an organic attempt to tackle the most dramatic problems of the occupation. A global negotiating platform with the civil service unions was reached in October; in November, a new regulation on land use was prepared and the set of delegated decrees for the organization of cultural and environmental assets in the center and periphery was launched; in December the Council of Ministers approved, albeit in the midst of recurrent controversies and attempts at differentiation by the PSI, a vast set of measures for industrial reconversion and for the refinancing of the laws on the South. As already in the days of De Gasperi, the two-tone DC-republicans seemed almost to embody and represent the extreme form of collaboration between Catholic and lay forces in the growing crisis of institutions, punctuated by a radical transformation of the structures of the ways of life and customs of Italian society. A transformation that could not pass without adequate reflections in the composition and balance of the political forces of the majority and opposition.
The patient and courageous work of the two-tone DC-PRI, chaired by the Hon. Moro, in order to stem the disastrous effects of the dramatic Italian economic crisis, was abruptly interrupted, at the very beginning of 1976, by the decision of the PSI to remove parliamentary support from the government. First, an article by the secretary Hon. De Martino, published in the Avanti! of December 31, 1975, then, a formal position taken by the central committee of January 7, specified the terms of a dissent with the government, which had as immediate points of reference the recent proposal for a plan to relaunch the national economy and the choices in the matter of financial interventions in favor of the South, judged by the socialists to be inadequate and too advantageous for entrepreneurs. But much more complex and nuanced were the root causes of the malaise of the PSI, which had advised its secretary to make a sudden decision, severely judged by all the other parties of the constitutional arc, including the Communists.
